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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John E. Reid
Psychologist's Expert Testimony Regarding the "I. Q." of an Accused

In a recent issue of the British Journal of Psychology two English
court cases dealing with the expert testimony of a psychologist regarding
the Intelligence Quotient of a person accused of receiving stolen property
1
were reported and commented on by John M. Gibbs.
It appears the defendant, together with his brother and brother-in-law,
operated a restaurant, but dispensed with the business for the duration of the
war when the brother and brother-in-law were inducted into the Army.
Later the defendant was approached by a man who offered to sell a large
quantity of meat at 18 s. a tin. The defendant accepted the offer when the
price was reduced to 12 s. and subsequently sold the goods at a profit.
A similar transaction was entered into by the defendant with another man,
involving the sale of men's clothing, in which the defendant made a large
profit and stated at the time of the sale that "he knew the stuff was not
straight."
The solicitor for the defense alleged the defendant to be mentally deficient
and referred him to the Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency
for a report on his intelligence.
The psychologist who conducted the tests was called as an expert witness
and testified, before a jury, that the defendant had an Intelligence Qu6tient
of 47 (imbecile rating) and a mental age of seven years.
The prosecution alleges that since the defendant was able to transact two
profitable business deals he should be classified as one having a shrewd but
guilty mind. The defendant was found guilty in one case and not guilty in
the other.
With respect to the value of the "I. Q." to legal proceedings, Gibbs
states: "It is not difficult to suggest cases in which an estimate of the
intelligence of the person charged, whether child or adult, would assist the
judge and jury or the magistrate in their assessment of the facts of the
case and the degree of guilt of the person charged. The general rule of law
is that a person cannot be convicted in a proceeding of a criminal nature unless it can be shown he has a guilty mind 'mens rea.' In this instance the
'mens rea' is easily established, but in others it must be dependent, in part
at least, on the intelligence or comprehension of the accused. The law
accepts this for it holds that no child under the age of eight years can be
guilty of any offense and this in spite of most overwhelming evidence to the
contrary both as to the child's acts and intention. . . . In certain offenses
such as 'receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen' the degree
of intelligence of the accused may well decide whether he should have known
from the proved facts that the goods were stolen or whether he could be
imposed upon and so receive them in all innocence. In cases where two or
more persons are jointly charged, their respective I. Q. would be of assistance
in determining the various roles of such persons and in assessing the differing
degrees of complicity."
1 Brit. Jour. of Psychol. 83: 103-112 (Oct. 1942).

